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Conventional wisdom holds that parity has increased in college football in recent decades
due largely to limits on the number of scholarships teams can offer. The authors find that
competitive balance has not increased in college football since the end of World War II,
and they find mixed evidence of scholarship limits’ effect on a range of measures of parity,
including the standard deviation of winning percentages and Associated Press rankings.
They also examine the 1991 NCAA roll-call vote to reduce the scholarship limit and find
some evidence that stronger teams were more likely to vote for the lower limit.
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The end of summer heralds the start of the college football season in America, a
tradition that goes back more than a century. Although hope always springs eternal
for sports fans, experts particularly remark about the degree of parity in college
football today compared to the dominance of the sport by a handful of powers in
decades past. Many commentators attribute parity to NCAA scholarship limits.
The NCAA in 1977 limited Division I-A schools to 95 scholarships and then in
1992 reduced the limit to 85 and no more than 25 in any one year. Scholarship limits
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prevent top programs from stockpiling players; talented players not receiving a
scholarship from a power might instead sign with a weaker team.1
The conventional wisdom takes increased parity as a stylized fact and assumes
scholarship limits could not reduce competitive balance. Yet scholarship limits
could prevent a football outsider from breaking into the elite. Traditional powers
possess numerous advantages in recruiting high school players, including large fan
bases, the expectation of future success, and extra television appearances. A school
seeking to break into the elite might need to spend more for facilities, coaches, and
players to offset the established powers’ advantages. Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison
(1992) and Eckard (1998) argue that the NCAA protects the traditional powers;
scholarship limits could be one means of entrenching football incumbents.
We explore measures of parity in college football since World War II and the
effect of scholarship limits on competitive balance. We also include other changes
in the rules of college football, like the 1984 Supreme Court ruling against the
NCAA’s control over television contracts in National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma et al. and changes in fresh-
men eligibility. We employ measures of parity based on the final Associated Press
(AP) rankings, the conference champions, the average margin of victory, and the
standard deviation of winning percentages of major college teams.
The article proceeds as follows. The first section discusses goals the NCAA may
pursue in managing the college football cartel and the role of scholarship limits. We
contrast three hypothesized roles for scholarship limits: (a) to limit the talent of top
programs and level the playing field, (b) to protect the existing powers by restricting
the efforts of outsiders to break into the football elite, and (c) to limit the costs of
college football. We examine two types of evidence to discriminate between these
rationales for scholarship limits: the effect of limits on parity and analysis of the
NCAA vote to lower the scholarship limit to 85. The second section describes the
measures of parity used in this study. The third section presents evidence on the
effect of limits on competitive balance. Contrary to perception, parity has not
increased in college football since 1977; indeed, several measures indicate a
decrease in parity. We also present econometric estimates of a model of competitive
balance in football that includes a time trend and other football policy changes. The
regressions find mixed evidence of the effect of scholarship limits on parity. Conse-
quently, the fourth section presents analysis of the NCAA roll-call vote to reduce
the scholarship limit, which provides more direct evidence on the possible motive
for scholarship limits. Recent (but not historical) success significantly determinant
of votes, which suggests that scholarship limits were intended to either entrench
incumbents or not affect competitive balance. Finally, we offer a brief conclusion.
SCHOLARSHIP LIMITS AND PARITY
The original purpose of the NCAA was to limit football injuries (Byers, 1995;
Fleisher et al., 1992), but groups formed for one collective purpose often pursue
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other goals as a by-product (Olson, 1965). Economists generally concur that today
the NCAA acts as a cartel in maintaining the amateur status of collegiate athletes—
that is, keeping the salaries of student-athletes set to zero (Becker, 1987; Fizel &
Bennett, 2000; Fleisher et al., 1992). The NCAA has been called the “best monop-
oly in America” (Barro, 1996, pp. 127-131). The NCAA is a nonprofit organization
and so may not pursue profit maximization in the conventional manner. The cartel
may pursue other goals at the expense of profit and take the profits from amateur
status in nonpecuniary forms like perks, publicity, and success on the football field.
Member schools—and their students, fans, and alumni—value winning football
games. Success in football may generate several tangible benefits for universities:
increased revenue through ticket sales and attracting extra students (Borland, Goff,
& Pulsinelli, 1992); larger gifts from alumni, both for athletic programs and the uni-
versity (McCormick & Tinsley, 1990); and a larger applicant pool, which allows
higher admission standards (McCormick & Tinsley, 1987).
Would the NCAA prefer more or less parity in college football? The answer
depends on the breadth of the membership represented by the organization. An
NCAA managing football in the interest of all its members (or at least Division I-A
football schools) would choose policies to maximize the value of the product; thus,
the NCAA would seek to increase fan interest and maximize revenues from atten-
dance and the value of television broadcast rights (DeBrock & Hendricks, 1997).
Greater parity might be a means of achieving this goal. But the NCAA may repre-
sent a narrower coalition, say, traditional football powers against would-be chal-
lengers. A narrow coalition NCAA would impose rules benefiting the traditional
powers. Several policies raise the costs of entrants and are consistent with a “narrow
cartel” view. The NCAA targets teams experiencing an improvement in win-loss
records for investigation for rules violations (Fleisher, Goff, Shughart, & Tollison,
1988) and requires Division I-A football participants to field a minimum number of
varsity teams and meet minimum stadium and attendance requirements (Fizel &
Bennett, 2001). Eckard (1998) finds that creation of a punishment mechanism for
the NCAA in 1952 reduced competitive balance, consistent with the narrow cartel
thesis.
Two models could be applied to examine the expected impact of scholarship
limits on competitive balance. Signing high school players could be viewed as an
investment under uncertainty. Players are still developing physically at this age, and
competition in high school is not homogeneous. In addition, commitment and will-
ingness to work hard are difficult to observe yet affect transformation of a player’s
inherent ability into football skills. And exogenous factors like injuries can unex-
pectedly end a player’s career or slow his development. Each scholarship allows a
team to take a draw from the urn of high school talent. Strong teams historically get
the best high school prospects, with weaker schools signing players later. More
draws generate a higher probability of developing enough quality players (taking
in-season injuries into account) to field a successful team each year. Without limits,
a school will offer scholarships until marginal benefit equals marginal cost, keeping
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in mind that the benefit could include stockpiling promising players to deny their
services to rival teams.2 Binding limits increase top schools’ vulnerability to inju-
ries and possibly strengthen weaker teams, as players who would sign with elite
programs are forced to take scholarships at other schools. These arguments support
the conventional wisdom that limits hurt historically strong schools and produce
greater parity (Byers, 1995, p. 228).
Scholarship limits, though, might also limit the number of players signed by and
thus hurt weaker teams. In other words, the conventional wisdom focuses on the
partial equilibrium effect of limits on top programs. Weaker programs face a riskier
investment decision because they do not sign the best high school players and, thus,
need to sign more players per position in hopes of developing one quality starter.
Additionally, scholarships may not be necessary to attract high school players to a
college program, because some walk on (enroll in classes without a scholarship)
and then try out for the football team. In choosing among colleges, a player will
consider the quality of education and the prospect of success during a player’s
career—winning seasons, television appearances, bowl games, conference cham-
pionships, and so on. Traditional powers offer the likelihood of winning, which a
new program or traditional also-ran cannot. A school seeking to upgrade its football
program could raise financial resources to fund scholarships (and build facilities
and hire coaches) but can establish a winning tradition only through winning.
Scholarship limits might force all teams to rely on walk-ons to supplement scholar-
ship recruits, and traditional powers can offer walk-ons more intangible benefits
than can also-rans.3 The current scholarship limits also prevent a team from award-
ing more than 25 scholarships in a year. A traditionally weak program might use all
or most of its scholarships on one large recruiting class in hopes of success 4 or 5
years later with an experienced team, success that could change the attitudes of the
media and high school players toward the program and improve its long-term pros-
pects for success.4
The invariance proposition of the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960) provides
another model to apply to scholarship limits. The invariance proposition holds that
with tradable property rights and zero transactions costs, changes in institutional
rules should not affect the allocation of resources. The Coase theorem has been
widely applied to the market for professional baseball players (Daly & Moore,
1981; Hylan, Lage, & Treglia, 1996) and predicts that the introduction of free
agency should not alter the distribution of players. Consequently, if transactions
costs are low, free agency should not affect competitive balance either, as Butler
(1995) does indeed find. The invariance proposition suggests that if transactions
costs are low, scholarship limits should not affect competitive balance in college
football. Transactions costs, however, are not zero in the market for college football
players; specifically, schools are limited in their ability to make cash payments to
players. Scholarship limits raise transactions costs, at least marginally, and thus
might affect parity by reallocating some players to programs where they produce
lower value. But whether the highest-valued users of the players in question are tra-
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ditional powers or weaker schools is theoretically ambiguous (Daly & Moore,
1981).5 Again, the theoretical impact of limit is ambiguous.
A way of viewing scholarship limits is as a means to control the cost of college
football and prevent dissipation of the rents created by the amateur status of college
athletes. The NCAA prevents salary competition for athletes, but even successful
cartels tend to dissipate the consequent rents through nonprice competition. Suc-
cess in football is a positional good, and cartel members might be particularly vul-
nerable to dissipation of rents in this fashion. Frank and Cook (1995), in fact, praise
NCAA scholarship limits as a successful cooperative agreement to prevent a costly
positional arms race. An equal scholarship limit for all schools may have no effect
on competitive balance; competitive balance might be the same if each team gave
out 125 scholarships instead of the current limit of 85.6 Alternatively, limits may
have some effect on competitive balance, which cartel members may accept
because of the cost savings.
TRENDS IN PARITY
Parity means greater competitive balance. In college football, however, parity
could have as many as three meanings. First, it could refer to balance within games.
Parity in this case would mean more competitive games—for instance, a closer final
score and more lead changes. Second, parity could refer to balance within seasons.
Here, parity means a smaller difference in winning percentages between the top and
bottom of the standings, with teams on the bottom at least occasionally defeating
the teams on top. Third, parity could refer to balance across seasons, with different
teams winning bowl games and conference titles from year to year. Parity could
increase by one measure with no change in another measure. In the absence of a
consensus measure of parity, we employ several measures based on the final margin
of games, the winning percentages of all teams, AP final rankings for each season,
and conference champions. The source for all the college football records used in
this study is Stassen (2001).
Our first measure of parity uses the margin of difference in major college foot-
ball games, a measure of parity within games. MARGIN is the difference between
the average score of the winning teams in a year and the average score of losing
teams. A smaller value of this variable indicates greater parity, although differences
in scheduling implies that MARGIN may not be a reliable measure of balance over
time.
Our second measure of parity uses the theoretical standard deviation and mea-
sures balance across games within a season. The theoretical standard deviation,
introduced by Scully (1989), equals .5/g.5, where g is the number of games played in
a season. We calculate the actual standard deviation of winning percentages of all
Division I-A (or Division I-A equivalent) schools in a given year. Our parity vari-
able is RATIO, the actual standard deviation divided by the theoretical standard
deviation, a measure employed by Bennett and Fizel (1995). Total parity would
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produce a value of 1.0 for this variable, whereas a larger value indicates less
balance.
We use three season-to-season measures employed by Eckard (1998) and based
on the final AP college football writers’ rankings. Our measures include poll
entrants/reentrants (teams appearing in the rankings after not appearing in any of
the 5 previous years), the total number of different teams appearing in the rankings
over a given number of years, and a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of concen-
tration of poll appearances. We construct measures using both the entire Top 20 and
just the Top 10—the latter measures the very elite of college football, which might
correspond with the definition of success for fans and teams. More entrants/
reentrants, more total teams appearing in the rankings, and a smaller HHI score
indicate greater parity.
We construct these three competitive balance measures using conference cham-
pions. Conference champions provide an objective measure of success, in contrast
to the possibly subjective evaluations of sports writers in the AP rankings; also,
many teams and fans set conference titles as a season goal. We construct the above
described entrant/reentrant, total champions, and champion HHI for six major con-
ferences: the Atlantic Coast; Big 10; Big 8/12; Southeastern; Pacific 8/10; and
Southwest, replaced in the 1990s by the Big East.7
SCHOLARSHIP LIMITS AND PARITY
We examine college football since the end of World War II, the years 1946
through 2000.8 Our primary interest is the effect of scholarship limits on parity, and
the 95-scholarship limit was first imposed in 1977. We begin with a comparison of
competitive balance in college football before and after imposition of scholarship
limits. To avoid complications with reversion to mean, we follow Eckard (1998)
and compare time periods of equal length before and after. Allowing 5 years follow-
ing first implementation of limits for transition effects, this provides 20 years, 1982
to 2001, of play under scholarship limits. Our prelimit period, then, is 1957 to 1976.
Our pre-scholarship-limit comparison period falls within the era of NCAA enforce-
ment of eligibility, which began in 1952.
Table 1 presents our 11 measures of competitive balance for the 1957 to 1976
and 1982 to 2001 periods.9 The MARGIN, RATIO, and ENTRANT variables are
the means of the annual values of these variables for each 20-year period. Calcula-
tion of the total teams and HHI variables use the number of appearances or titles by
each school over the 20-year period. The evidence on the effect of scholarship lim-
its is mixed. Competitive balance is lower in the period of scholarship limitation
with MARGIN and RATIO, and these differences are significant at the .01 level.
The measures based on the AP Top 20 also all indicate reduced parity. By contrast,
the measures based on the AP Top 10 indicate greater parity during the period of
scholarship limitation. The measures based on conference champions are mixed in
direction but are all very small in magnitude, which suggests no systematic effect of
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scholarship limits on competitive balance. The differences in entrants for both AP
totals and conference champions are not significant.
We turn next to time series measures of competitive balance over the entire post-
war period. Here we calculate team totals and HHI over 5-year periods. For exam-
ple, the 1950 values of these variables are based on the five seasons from 1946 to
1950.10 Figures 1, 2, and 3 display the time series of eight of our competitive bal-
ance variables; Figure 1 displays RATIO and MARGIN, Figure 2 displays the total
number of teams in the Top 20 and Top 10 and that are conference champions; and
Figure 3 displays the HHI for the Top 20, Top 10, and conference champions.
MARGIN trends downward from about 19 to its low of 14.14 in 1964, then spikes
up sharply over the next several years and has been relatively steady since 1975,
first around 16.5 and then around 17.5 for the past decade. RATIO remains rela-
tively steady at values less than 1.50 for the first 30 years of our sample, then rises to
values generally in excess of 1.50 over the past 25 years, with no discernable trends
within these ranges. The total teams counts begin at historically high levels in the
early 1950s, then remain steady until taking sharp declines in the early 1970s and
then returning to approximately the same levels by the late 1980s as in the 1960s.
The HHIs all follow a similar pattern of remaining steady at low levels throughout
the 1950s and 1960s and then reaching their postwar peaks in the early 1970s, fol-
lowed by declines to relatively steady states, although at higher levels of concentra-
tion generally than prior to the late 1960s.
Comparison of the prelimitation and postlimitation periods does not control for
other changes possibly affecting competitive balance in college football. Scholar-
ship limits might well have increased parity in college football, ceteris paribus, but
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TABLE 1: Comparison of Parity Measures Before and After Scholarship Limits
Measure 1957-1976 1982-2001
MARGIN 16.24 17.19
RATIO 1.41 1.59
Top 20
Entrants (per year) 3.70 3.35
Total teams 79 68
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 224.8 244.3
Top 10
Entrants (per year) 2.05 2.70
Total teams 47 52
HHI 377.5 352.0
Conference champs
Entrants (per year) 2.05 1.95
Total teams 36 35
HHI 510.2 492.1
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other rule changes might have led to less balance, offsetting the effect of limits. Or
scholarship limits might have canceled a time trend toward less balance. To exam-
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Figure 1: Time Trend for MARGIN and RATIO
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ine the marginal effect of limits, we estimate the following model using our various
measures of parity as dependent variables:
Parity = β0 + β1*S95t + β2*S85t + β3*TEAMSt
+ β4*FRESHMANt + β5*TVt + β6*TIMEt + εt.
(1)
S95 and S85 are dummy variables that equal one for the years in which the 95-
scholarship (1977-1991) and 85-scholarship (1992-2001) limits were in effect.
TEAMS is the number of teams competing in Division I-A or the estimated equiva-
lent level of play prior to the creation of Division I-A in 1978; the conference title
regressions use the number of teams in the relevant conferences. An increase in the
number of teams should produce more total teams appearing in the AP rankings or
winning conference titles over a given period and lower HHI values. FRESHMAN
is a dummy variable that equals one for years in which freshmen were eligible to
play major college football, 1972-2001. The impact of freshman eligibility is
ambiguous. Extra eligibility increases the impact of the best players, and the best
players tend to play for the top teams, which suggests a decrease in parity. But top
teams also have greater depth and may not need to play freshmen. TV is a dummy
variable that equals one for the years following the Supreme Court’s ruling elimi-
nating the NCAA’s control over college football contracts (1984-2001). The
NCAA television contract limited the number of appearances by top teams and
shared the revenue. Elimination of these provisions allowed premier teams and
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conferences to negotiate their own television deals and keep more of the revenue,
which should lead to less parity. Bennett and Fizel (1995) and Eckard (1998), how-
ever, found no evidence that the television ruling reduced balance. TIME is a time
trend and equals the current year minus 1945. Social changes like greater mobility
and declining travel costs could lead to greater or lesser parity over time absent rule
changes, and the time trend controls for any such effects.11
Table 2 presents our estimates of the model in Equation 1. We employ Cochrane-
Orcutt estimation to correct for autocorrelation detected in the original estimates.
We first consider the scholarship limitation variables. In evaluating the impact of
limits, we especially consider whether the two scholarship variables affect parity in
the same direction and, if so, whether S85 has a larger quantitative impact than S95.
Scholarship limits reduce within season parity as measured by RATIO. The coeffi-
cients for S95 and S85 are both significantly positive in this case, and the point esti-
mate for S85 is almost twice as large as that for S95. S85 is significant and S95
insignificant three times, for total Top-20 teams, Top-20 HHI, and total Top-10
teams; and in each case, scholarship limits increase parity. Also, in these cases, the
point estimate of S95 also indicates greater parity, is smaller than the estimate of
S85, and is close to statistical significance. S95 is significant and indicates greater
parity for conference HHI, whereas S85 is insignificant with a positive point esti-
mate in this case, which is implausible if scholarship limits produce greater parity.
In the other three cases, both the scholarship limit variables are insignificant. Our
results indicate a complicated relationship between scholarship limits and competi-
tive balance, and that the effect may be different for within- and across-season
measures.
The most consistently significant control variable is FRESHMAN, which is sig-
nificant in five cases (all across-year measures of parity), and in each case, fresh-
man eligibility reduced competitive balance. Allowing the very best players an
extra year of eligibility has benefited the strongest teams. TIME is significant three
times (in the same cases where S85 is significant and S95 insignificant) and in each
case indicates a trend toward less parity over time, consistent with greater concen-
tration. The time trend obscures the effect of scholarship limits in the comparisons
in Table 1. TEAMS was significant twice, for both the conference champion mea-
sures, which is not surprising given that there are more than 100 Division I-A foot-
ball teams but only about 50 in the major conferences. TV is significant only once,
for total Top-10 teams, and in this case, the estimate indicates greater parity. The
general insignificance of TV is consistent with the results of Bennett and Fizel
(1995) and Eckard (1998).
ANALYSIS OF THE NCAA VOTE
George Stigler (1975) argued that the intent of policies should be divined from
their actual effects. Stigler’s dictum in this case would suggest that scholarship lim-
its were adopted to protect against dissipation of cartel rents. Inferring intent from
12 JOURNAL OF SPORTS ECONOMICS / February 2003
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TABLE 2: Regression Analysis of Determinants of Parity
Dependent Variable
MARGIN RATIO Top-20 Teams Top-20 HHI Top-10 Teams Top-10 HHI Conference Teams Conference HHI
S95 0.956 0.116* 3.42 –18.2 2.47 –60.3 2.06 –171*
(1.12) (1.82) (1.61) (1.52) (1.49) (1.59) (1.35) (2.41)
S85 –0.462 0.197* 8.50* –4.24* 3.82* –36.5 0.959 23.6
(0.38) (2.99) (2.83) (2.50) (2.15) (0.69) (0.39) (0.23)
TEAMS 0.0500 0.00092 0.0627 0.0876 –0.0474 0.718 0.640* –59.1*
(1.54) (0.39) (0.78) (0.19) (0.78) (0.50) (2.13) (4.25)
FRESHMAN 0.0621 0.0244 –3.28 30.6* –5.35* 97.7* –2.71* 145*
(0.07) (0.54) (1.56) (2.58) (4.55) (2.64) (1.71) (2.02)
TV –0.678 –0.0458 1.06 –17.6 5.00* –49.2 0.216 23.3
(0.81) (1.13) (0.52) (1.51) (4.74) (1.38) (0.15) (0.33)
TIME 0.0506 0.00308 –0.258* 1.66* –0.125* 0.991 –0.0265 1.56
(0.99) (1.49) (2.00) (2.25) (2.13) (0.46) (0.32) (0.35)
Constant 9.41* 1.21* 43.9* 245* 35.0* 398* –10.6 3,510*
(1.96) (3.57) (3.70) (3.65) (4.09) (1.91) (0.78) (5.69)
Adjusted R 2 .535 .711 .826 .853 .687 .700 .491 .799
No. of
observations 56 56 52 52 52 52 52 52
NOTE: Absolute t statistics appear in parentheses. HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
*Significant at .10 level or better.
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effect, though, requires that NCAA members correctly anticipate the impact of
scholarship limits. Regulations sometimes have unintended consequences or fail to
achieve their goal. We examine the determinants of the vote to reduce the scholar-
ship limit from 95 to 85 for direct evidence on the motive for scholarship limits.12
The NCAA often passes measures via roll-call votes, and these votes have been
used to explore the cartel’s motives (DeBrock & Hendricks, 1990; Fleisher, Goff, &
Tollison, 1990). The vote at the NCAA’s 1991 annual meeting was 59 to 43 in favor
of lowering the limit. Seven conferences voted on the proposal, so 95 schools cast
votes. We estimate the following probit model of the roll-call vote:
VOTE = γ0 + γ1*AP + γ2*AP10 + γ3*AGE + γ4*PUBLIC + γ5*TUITION
+ γ6*ENROLL + γ7*MAJCONF + γ8*CYES + γ9*CNO
+ γ10*PHD + γ11*PROBATE + µ.
(2)
VOTE is a dummy variable that equals one for schools voting to reduce the limit.
AP and AP10 measure performance in the final AP poll. We assign points for
appearances on a descending basis; the team ranked 1st receives 20 points, the team
ranked 2nd 19 points, and so on down to 1 point for the team ranked 20th. AP sums
teams’ scores over the entire period of the AP poll, 1936 to 1991, whereas AP10
sums teams’ scores over the 10 seasons prior to the vote, 1982-1991. Positive signs
for AP and AP10 indicate that traditional powers might have been trying to
entrench themselves, whereas negative signs suggest that the have-nots were trying
to level the playing field. We allow both historical and recent success to separately
influence the vote. AGE is the age in years of the university in 1992. PUBLIC is a
dummy variable that equals one for state and state-supported universities. Access to
state funding for stadiums and facilities and legislative appropriations to cover a
portion of the cost of education might produce different attitudes toward scholar-
ship limits for public and private schools. TUITION is in-state tuition in thousands
of dollars and proxies the cost to the school of scholarship (even if the economic
cost of a student athlete is less than tuition) as well as the cost to players of walking
on without a scholarship. The cost effect suggests a positive sign for this variable,
whereas the walk-on effect predicts a negative sign for this variable. ENROLL is
the school’s total enrollment in the 1991-92 academic year in thousands of students.
MAJCONF is a dummy variable that equals one if a school was a member of a
major conference in 1992, which we define here as the Atlantic Coast, Big East,
Big 8, Big 10, Pacific 10, Southeastern, and Southwest.13 Conferences share televi-
sion and bowl revenues, so members of the major conferences could have different
positions toward scholarship limits than independents or members of minor confer-
ences. CYES and CNO are dummy variables that equal one for members of confer-
ences that voted for and against the lower scholarship limit. If the conference votes
represent the views of members, these variables should have positive and negative
signs, respectively. Note that members did not vote as a block in line with their con-
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ference; Michigan and Tennessee, for example, voted for the lower limits, whereas
the Big 10 and Southeastern Conference voted against. PHD is a dummy variable
that equals one for doctoral-granting universities (a school must have a minimum
number of Ph.D. programs across disciplines). Graduate education may be a com-
petitor for football resources at doctoral-granting institutions. PROBATE is a
dummy variable that equals one for schools on NCAA probation for football
between 1953 and 1991. We employ Fleisher et al.’s (1992) list of schools on proba-
tion between 1953 and 1983, updated with our own search of NCAA records for
1984 to 1991.14 Past NCAA rules violations could affect a school’s attitude toward
stricter rules in the future.
We are most interested in whether past success affected voting. The mean value
of AP for the schools voting yes was 105.4, whereas the mean for schools voting no
was 105.1, so historical success would seem to be irrelevant. Schools voting yes did
have slightly greater recent success; the mean of AP10 was 22.2 for schools voting
yes and 18.3 for schools voting no. We estimated the full model with both AP and
AP10 as independent variables, but both were insignificant. The two measures of
success are highly correlated (correlation coefficient = .77), so we estimated the
model with AP and AP10 separately. We present here the probit estimate of the
model of voting with AP10 (absolute t statistics in parentheses)
VOTE = .965 + .00940*AP10 + .00535*AGE – .206*TUTION + .00303*ENROLL
(0.67) (1.76) (1.18) (1.69) (0.15)
(3)
– .700*MAJCONG + 1.31*CYES –.692*CNO + 1.77*PHD – .385*PROBATE
(1.76) (2.66) (1.93) (2.45) (1.17)
N = 95, percentage of correct predictions = 74.7.
The regression finds that recently successful teams were more likely to vote for
the limits, consistent with the thesis that scholarship limits entrench incumbents.
But the interpretation must be qualified because when the model was estimated
with AP, AP was positive and insignificant (coefficient of .00205, t statistic of
1.40).15 Conference votes for and against the measure are significant determinants
of voting in the expected direction, and doctoral-granting institutions were more
likely to support the lower limit. Members of major conferences, public universi-
ties, and schools with higher tuition were all significantly more likely to vote
against the proposal. ENROLL, AGE, and PROBATE were all insignificant.
CONCLUSIONS
Conventional wisdom holds that parity is greater in college football today than
ever before and that scholarship limits have fostered today’s competitive balance. A
variety of measures indicate that the stylized fact is false; indeed, several measures
indicate that college football has been less balanced since the imposition of scholar-
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ship limits. Regression analysis of time series measures indicates that the relation-
ship between scholarship limits and parity is complicated. Scholarship limits seem
to have reduced within-year parity while increasing parity as measured with the AP
Top 20. Only 4 out of 16 scholarship-limit coefficients were significantly consistent
with greater parity, so again the conventional wisdom is without support. The effect
of scholarship limits suggests they serve to limit resources spent on football. An
examination of the NCAA vote reducing the scholarship limit to 85 finds that recent
success on the field made schools more likely to vote for the lower limit, but success
over the entire postwar period did not affect voting. These results support the inter-
pretations that the limits were to protect incumbent football powers or perhaps to
protect rents generated by amateur status; the interpretation that weaker schools
voted to level the playing field is rejected.
Our results raise the question, Why do scholarship limits not produce greater
parity? Three explanations seem possible: (a) Scholarship limits have not been
enforced or have been evaded, (b) the current limit of 85 scholarships is too high for
limits to weaken strong programs, or (c) limits negatively impact both strong and
weak programs, leaving competitive balance unchanged. The NCAA can easily
measure the number of scholarships awarded, and athletes with scholarships for
other sports cannot play football, so lack of enforcement of the current limit seems
inadequate. Our research does not allow us to discriminate between the other two
explanations. Future research on this question might focus on the relative impact of
nonscholarship, walk-on players. If traditional powers attract more and better walk-
ons than also-rans, this would suggest that marginally lower scholarship limits will
not increase parity and may even entrench incumbents.
NOTES
1. Scholarship limits were imposed in the 1970s before Title IX and gender equity became a con-
cern in college athletics. Conceivably, repeal of scholarship limits today may have less effect on the
number of scholarships than their imposition in 1977.
2. The tendency of people to overrate their relative ability also tends to help traditional powers in
signing top high school players, many of whom will end up being reserves.
3. Nebraska, for instance, has a very successful walk-on tradition and has won at least nine games
every year from 1968 to 2001.
4. The University of Pittsburgh in fact pursued this strategy under Johnny Majors in the 1970s; the
university granted 83 scholarships in Majors’s first recruiting class, a class that posted a 33-13-1 record
and won the 1976 national championship (Byers, 1995, p. 228).
5. As Daly and Moore (1981) argue, teams may not consider the public good benefit of increased
interest in the sport as a whole, and thus, players may move to the teams with the highest marginal private
value but not the highest marginal value for the league as a whole.
6. Only a limit on the total number of scholarships would be necessary to reduce the total cost of
college football, and thus, rent dissipation cannot explain the limit of 25 scholarships per year.
7. For cochamps we give each team a fractional title and allow fractional titles to sum to one in
determining the number of different teams to win a title over a period.
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8. The war disrupted the normal conduct of the sport; teams of military personnel competed against
college teams. Excluding the war years would leave only a few years of Associated Press (AP) rankings
from the 1930s.
9. The conference champion variables for this comparison used the ACC, Big 10, Big 8/12, Pacific
Coast, and SEC.
10. The time series conference champion variable drops the ACC, which did not form until 1953, and
uses the Southwest Conference until the 1995 season, replaced then by the Big East.
11. Three other control variables were also included: PROP 48, a dummy variable equaling one for
the years in which the NCAA’s Proposition 48 academic eligibility requirements were in place for fresh-
men (1986-2001); NCAA, a dummy variable equaling one for the years prior to NCAA enforcement
(1946-1951); and SPEND, real per capita aggregate state government spending. In no case were any of
these variables significant, and so they are omitted in the specifications presented here.
12. No roll-call vote was recorded when the initial 95-scholarship limit was adopted.
13. These were the same conferences used for our conference champion variable, except for the
addition of the ACC. The champions of these conferences now receive automatic berths in the Bowl
Championship Series, except that the Big 12 is the successor to the Big 8 and SWC. We include Penn
State in the Big 10 even though it did not play football in the conference until 1993.
14. The penalties involved for schools on probation varied considerably, from public reprimands to
the “death penalty” 1-year suspension of the program at Southern Methodist University. We excluded
several schools from the NCAA’s list where apparently no penalty was imposed. In total, 40 of the 95
schools in our roll call were on probation.
15. The coefficients on the other variables were very similar, with AP in place of AP10.
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